The problem
Most marketing plans have a volume target. More leads. More opportunities. More of whatever the dashboard counts. It is easy to set, easy to track, and easy to hit in a way that does nothing for the business.
The trouble with a count is what it rewards. The cheapest way to add opportunities is to chase the people who are already close: the ones who fill out a form, scan a badge, or download the guide. They are real, and they are small. A team measured on count will find a way to make more of them.
Meanwhile, the deals that move a business are bigger, slower, and involve several people. They rarely start with a form fill. They start with an account that has a problem, a group of people who each see part of it, and a vendor that shows up with something useful before anyone asked.
So a plan that says “more opportunities” and a story that says “fewer, bigger deals” point in opposite directions. If you want the second outcome, the plan has to measure it. This guide is about how a system can produce fewer opportunities and larger ones, and what you have to say alongside the numbers so the claim holds up.
The system
Four moves.
- 1Score dollars and conversion
- 2Aim at the account
- 3Stop the small work
- 4Separate the reporting
Judge dollars and conversion, not counts
The first move is to change what gets scored. Pipeline dollars and conversion go on the scorecard. Opportunity counts stay on the page, but as a diagnostic. They tell you whether the engine is running. They do not tell you whether it is working.
- ScoreDollars and conversionHow many will convert, and how much they will spend.
- WatchLeads and opportunitiesWhether the engine is running.
There is a real argument against this. Marketing’s primary responsibility is filling the funnel, and giving those leads a quality dimension so they convert to sales-accepted leads. Marketing does not control the value of the opportunity. It is still the metric that matters, and using it is a judgment call. Leads and opportunities stay on the page. The dollar figure is what lets you see audience quality. It is not only how many will convert. It is how much they will spend.
Aim at accounts and buying groups
The second move is the unit of work. For the accounts that matter most, the unit is the account, one use case, and the buying group around it. Not the contact. A contact is a person who might be a champion. An account with a use case is something you can build a plan around.
- AccountThe unit of work
- Use caseOne useful change
- Buying groupNot a single contact
Aiming at the account starts from fit and a hypothesis about a useful change. The first offer is something of value, not a demo request. Sales accepts the opportunity on its own judgment. The result is fewer opportunities, because you are no longer counting every hand that goes up.
The plays that do this are account-based, for named accounts, and specifically 1:few. They produce outsize results on expansion opportunities inside existing customer accounts. What you want to see is higher ACV on that expansion than on a new logo. That is the motion working.
A buying group is usually three or four people with different jobs: someone who feels the problem, someone who evaluates the options, someone who controls the money, and someone who can say no. Marketing that reaches only the first person produces a nice conversation and a stalled deal. Marketing that reaches the group, each with a reason that fits their job, produces the kind of opportunity that is larger and slower and more likely to close.
- FeelsThe problem
- EvaluatesThe options
- PaysControls the money
- BlocksCan say no
Stop the work that makes small opportunities
Fewer opportunities does not happen by itself. Somebody has to stop something. Programs that produce volume with no path to a large deal are the first candidates. Cutting them lowers the count on its own.
We stopped running evergreen campaigns. They were never really evergreen. The campaign was constantly updated, and the audience was not. We also stopped product-specific campaigns. They matched how we defined going to market, not how people wanted to buy. The focus now is audience segments and solution categories.
- WasEvergreenThe campaign was updated. The audience was not.
- WasProductHow we go to market, not how people buy.
- NowSegmentsAudience segments.
- NowSolutionsSolution categories.
Here is the test I use. If the count falls and the dollars hold or rise, the system is working. If the count falls and the dollars fall with it, you did not build a better engine. You built a smaller one. That is why the dollar number and the count have to sit side by side.
Keep new business separate from expansion
The fourth move is reporting. Expansion in the installed base is real, and it is a different job from winning a new logo or expanding the portfolio with an existing customer. If you blend them, expansion credit can flatter the whole story and hide what the strategic motions are doing. So I report New Logo and Portfolio Expansion on their own, with expansion alongside as context.
- New LogoIts own number
- PortfolioExpansion, on its own
- Installed baseContext, not blended in
The numbers
I keep each of these as its own number. I am not combining them into one percentage, and they do not stack.
Marketing-sourced new-business ACV was up 25% on 11% fewer opportunities. The period is 2026 year to date.
Average deal size per sourced opportunity was up 41%. The period is 2026 year to date.
Marketing-sourced deals win more often: a 40% vs 34% ACV win rate over five quarters. The period is over five quarters.
New Logo ACV was up 42%. The period is 2026 year to date. Portfolio Expansion ACV was up 62%. The period is 2026 year to date.
These numbers are different cuts of the same business. Read them together, and do not turn them into one headline. Sourced ACV rose while the opportunity count fell. Deal size rose. Win rate is higher for marketing-sourced deals. Each claim has its own period and its own definition. The 2026 figures are year to date, so they will move before year end.
Now the caveat that matters. The 41% is an average, and an average can be skewed by a few large deals. Anyone reading it should ask for the median, and for the average without the largest deals. I would rather you ask than assume.
- MedianNext to the average
- AverageThe 41% figure
- Without the largestWhat a few wins are carrying
What you can take with you
Start with what failed. When an audience gets very small and is not differentiated, you create adjacent audiences that step on each other. The other failure is time. If the timeline from concept to execution stretches out, the cost equation for a campaign aimed at a smaller, more specific audience evaporates. You are better off pulling the plug.
- Not distinctAdjacent audiences step on each other.
- Too slowThe cost equation evaporates. Pull the plug.
What I would change is to pick one primary measure before the year starts and make the plan and the story agree. I would put median deal size next to the average, and show the average without the largest deals, so a reader can see how much of the gain rests on a handful of wins. And I would report New Logo and Portfolio Expansion first, with expansion as context.
- 1One primary measure
- 2Median beside the average
- 3Average without the largest
- 4New logo and expansion apart
Here is the checklist.
First, pick one primary measure. If the plan says count and the story says size, fix the plan.
Second, judge programs on pipeline dollars and conversion. Keep opportunity counts as a diagnostic.
Third, report median deal size next to the average.
Fourth, report the average without your largest deals.
Fifth, separate new business from expansion in the installed base before you claim credit.
Fewer, bigger deals is a good outcome. It is also an easy one to overstate. The way to keep it honest is to show the number that could embarrass you, right next to the number that makes you look good.
